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I. INTRODUCTION
C1 LOBALIZATION" HAS become a common buzzword in
"3the business world. Technological and telecommunica-
tions breakthroughs have contributed to the growing trend to-
wards defining markets not in terms of cities or states, but rather
in terms of nations, continents, or even the entire planet. In
such a global landscape, mergers and joint ventures between
multinational business entities have become commonplace.
The international air transportation industry is no stranger to
this trend. The nature of air travel-the transportation of peo-
ple and goods over long distances-dictated long ago that the
airline industry develop an international approach to opera-
tions, financing, and marketing. Air carriers increasingly use
joint ventures to take full advantage of the economies of scale
that internationalization offers.
The goal of most international airline alliances is the creation
of an integrated network of products, services, and standards be-
tween two or more carriers.' Ideally, through alliances, carriers
are able to operate more efficiently by eliminating unnecessary
duplication of costs, thereby providing better service to their
customers.9 There are two general categories of alliances: "eq-
uity alliances" and 'joint venture alliances."3 In an equity alli-
ance, one airline acquires equity or part ownership of another.
Joint venture alliances do not include any change in ownership,
but instead exist to advance the carriers' specific objectives, such
as increased access to certain airports.4 Joint venture alliances
are necessarily narrower in scope than equity alliances because
there is no change in ownership, but both types of alliances usu-
ally involve some form of joint-marketing by the carriers.5
The proposed alliance between British Airways and American
Airlines has drawn attention to the subject of international air-
line alliances. The British Airways/American Airlines arrange-
] See Michael S. Simons, Aviation Alliances: Implications for the Qantas-BA Alliance
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ment exemplifies the typical joint venture alliance. It includes
provisions that coordinate the two carriers' passenger and cargo
services between the United States and Europe, establish full
reciprocity between frequent flier programs, and introduce ex-
tensive code-sharing provisions across each other's networks.6
Under a code-sharing agreement, an airline assigns its own code
to flights operated by another carrier, enabling passengers to fly
across the two carriers' networks as if they traveled on one air-
line for the entire trip.7 However, the entire alliance is contin-
gent on the establishment of an open skies agreement between
the United States and the United Kingdom.8
Equity alliances were especially popular in the early 1990s, as
foreign airlines purchased minority stakes in American carriers
as a means of penetrating the U.S. passenger market, the largest
in the world.9 Carriers such as Swissair, KLM, and British Air-
ways each acquired considerable percentages of their American
counterparts' stock.' Cross-ownership agreements between two
or more foreign carriers were also popular during this time pe-
riod. 1 Though some of these equity alliances enjoyed success,
most investment in U.S. airlines has been an economic disaster
for foreign carriers. 12
Instead, most carriers now favor joint venture alliances. De-
spite the attention given to the British Airways/American Air-
lines arrangement, other airlines have had similar agreements
for years. 13 Historically, alliances between foreign carriers and
U.S. carriers began in the 1980s. 4 Alliances currently exist be-
tween many airlines, including: Northwest and KLM; Delta and
Swissair; and Sabena, Austrian, United, and Lufthansa. 15 Air
6 See Press Release, American Airlines and British Airways to Create Worldwide Alli-
ance (June 11, 1996) <http://www.amrcorp.com/amr/aa ba-news.html> [here-
inafter Press Release].
7 See id. For a detailed discussion of code-sharing agreements, see generally
Simons, supra note 1, at 844-59. Typically, code-sharing agreements must be re-
ported to the Department of Transportation. See 14 C.F.R. § 217.10 app. (1997).
8 See Press Release, supra note 6. For a discussion of open-skies agreements,
see infra notes 271-86 and accompanying text.
9 See PAUL DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW & REGULATION 10-76 (1992).
10 See id.
11 See id. at 10-77.
12 See id.
13 See Diana Bentley, The European Union Has Become Antitrust Player, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 14, 1996, at B1; United Requests Inquiy into American-British Air Alliance, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 10, 1996, at 4D.
14 See DEMPSEY ET AL., supra note 9, at 10-75.
15 See United Requests Inquiry, supra note 13, at 4D.
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France also recently announced separate alliances with Delta
and Continental; however, both are contingent on a not-yet-rati-
fied open skies agreement between France and the United
States.' 6 In fact, by one estimate there are now over 400 airline
alliances worldwide, with more than a quarter of those involving
intercontinental agreements. 17
Antitrust enforcement agencies often scrutinize these alli-
ances because of their potential impact on competition within
the airline industry. Disgruntled competitors are also quick to
bring private antitrust actions challenging these alliances."
Moreover, the fact that joint venture airline alliances fall short
of being outright mergers does not mean that they are automati-
cally immune from antitrust scrutiny.' 9 Furthermore, the inter-
national dimension of airline alliances means that more than
one government's enforcement agency may engage in antitrust
review of a given alliance. For example, the British Airways-
American Airlines agreement is being scrutinized by officials
from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European
Union."'
This Comment will address the various substantive laws and
regulations implicated in an international airline alliance.
Rather than providing specific anaylsis keyed to the terms of any
one agreement, this Comment will serve as a broad introduction
to the basic antitrust issues that are raised in any international
airline alliance. Particular attention will be given to the laws of
the United States and the European Union because many cur-
rent alliances exist between airlines within these two jurisdic-
tions.2 ' Although this Comment concentrates on issues
pertinent to the international airline industry, many of the rele-
vant antitrust laws are applicable to all international joint ven-
16 See Air France Forms Alliances with Delta, Continental, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Oct. 17, 1996, at 2D.
17 See Simons, sufpra note 1, at 843-44.
18 See Judge Dismisses Part of Lawsuit Against BA-American Alliance, DALLAS MORN-
INC NEWS, Oct. 26, 1996, at 2F; see also infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. The associate general counsel
for American Airlines' parent company, AMR, expressed surprise over the Euro-
pean Commission's decision to examine the British Airways/American Airlines
alliance, because it technically is not a merger. See Bentley, supra note 13, at B1.
However, joint ventures are indeed covered under EU competition law. See infra
notes 170-211 and accompanying text.
20 See British Airways/American Airlines Alliance Raises Problems, EUROPEAN REPORT
No. 2152, July 27, 1996; see also Bentley, supra note 13, at B1.
21 The Pacific Rim, however, is also fertile ground for international airline alli-
ances. See Simons, supra note 1, at 862-67.
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tures. Thus, antitrust practitioners in other industries should
also find this Comment helpful.
II. AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW AND AIR
TRANSPORTATION
A. SUBSTANTIVE LAW: AN OVERVIEW
The three primary U.S. antitrust laws are the Sherman Act,
22
the Clayton Act,23 and the Federal Trade Commisssion (FTC)
Act.24 However, air carriers are specifically exempted from cov-
erage under the FTC Act.25 Thus, for purposes of airline alli-
ances, the Sherman Act and Clayton Act are the most relevant
statutes. The ultimate goal of U.S. antitrust law is to maintain
the integrity of the free market by protecting competition, not
individual competitors. 26 Accordingly, an antitrust plaintiff
must allege economic injury to the market as a whole or to in-
dustry competition in general, not merely injury to the competi-
tor himself.27
Basic liability under the antitrust laws begins with the Sher-
man Act. Section 1 prohibits "every contract, combination ...
[and] conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce ....- 2 8 Sec-
tion 1 applies to both interstate commerce and commerce with
foreign nations.29 Interestingly, the statute does not actually de-
fine "restraint of trade."3 ° A literal reading of the statute might
cripple the economy, because it indicates that "every" contract
that restrains commerce is illegal. Instead, the Supreme Court
has interpreted the phrase "restraint of trade" to prohibit only
those contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unduly re-
strain trade. 1
Section 2 of the Sherman Act governs unilateral conduct and
prohibits the act of monopolization, as well as the attempt to
22 Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1994)).
23 Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1994)).
24 Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
25 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1994).
26 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
27 See McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 815 (9th Cir. 1988).
28 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911).
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monopolize. 2 It too applies to both interstate commerce and
commerce with foreign nations." Notably, section 2 prohibits
the act of monopolization, not mere monopolies themselves. 4
The act of unlawful monopolization is defined as any purposeful
conduct to acquire, maintain, or obtain a monopoly, except
when the monopoly is attained by superior skill or foresight, or
it is thrust upon the monopolist by a thin market.3 5 Similarly, an
illegal attempt to monopolize requires the following: (1) spe-
cific intent to control prices or destroy competition in some part
of commerce; (2) predatory or anticompetitive conduct di-
rected to accomplishing the unlawful purpose; and (3) a dan-
gerous probability of success.3
The penalties for violating the antitrust laws are severe. The
Antitrust Division of the Department ofJustice (DOJ) is empow-
ered to seek injunctive relief for violations of the Sherman Act.37
Furthermore, the DOJ is empowered to convene a grand jury
with subpoena powers when it intends to bring a criminal ac-
tion.3 ' Any violation of the Sherman Act is a felony punishable
by a fine of up to $10 million for corporations or up to three
years in prison and a fine not to exceed $350,000 for other per-
sons."' Rather than risk these harsh penalties, most defendants
opt to settle government antitrust cases through an instrument
known as a consent decree-essentially a court-approved settle-
ment in which the defendant agrees to stop its questionable
behavior.4"
The Clayton Act also allows civil damages for violations of the
antitrust laws. Consequently, the DOJ can bring a civil suit on
behalf of the United States.4' Similarly, the attorneys general of
all fifty states are individually able to bring direct actions on be-
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
I' See id.
'14 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428-30 (2d Cir.
1945) (hearing appeal by virtue of a certificate of the Supreme Court). "The
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon
when he wins." Id. at 430.
,15 See id. at 429-30.
See Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993); see aLo William
Inglis & Sons v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
37 See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
38 See United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 680-84. (1958).
-1 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
40 See WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN & C. PAUL ROGERS III, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY &
PRACTICE 43 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995).
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1994).
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half of their respective states, as well as actions parens patriae for
natural persons residing in the state.42 Individual claimants are
also empowered to bring direct actions for injuries sustained be-
cause of another party's violation of the antitrust laws, without
waiting for government action.4 As an incentive for these pri-
vate actions, individual plaintiffs may recover attorneys' fees and
treble damages.4
Because of the inherent vagueness of the antitrust statutes,
federal courts have liberally interpreted them to supply needed
specificity.45 In general, the courts have developed two types of
tests for determining whether conduct violates the antitrust laws.
Some conduct is so anticompetitive that it is illegal per se.46
Other types of conduct are subject to a case-by-case balancing
test, known as the "rule of reason," in which the court balances
the pro- and anticompetitive elements of the suspicious transac-
tion.4 1 Usually, when the likely purpose or effect of an agree-
ment is to raise prices, it is per se illegal.48 On the other hand,
when purpose or effect is unclear, or when the defendant is able
to make a plausible argument that the suspicious agreement en-
hances competition or increases market efficiency, the rule of
reason analysis is most appropriate.49
Joint ventures between competitors have the potential to in-
hibit competition by driving other competitors out of the mar-
ketplace, eventually allowing the survivors to raise prices. Thus,
because joint ventures involve combinations and agreements be-
tween competitors, they are subject to scrutiny under the anti-
trust laws.5 ° Airline alliances typically resemble joint ventures
between competitors. Namely, two or more alliance members,
by agreeing to certain conduct that may restrain aeronautical
42 See id. § 15c.
43 See id. § 15.
44 See id. For a discussion of the controversial nature of these provisions in
international circles, see infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
45 A complete survey of every case is inappropriate for this Comment. See gener-
ally ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 40 (providing an exhaustive survey of U.S.
antitrust law).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972). "It is
only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts
classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act." Id. at 607-08.
47 See, e.g., Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 64-67.
48 See Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48-50 (1990).
49 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24
(1979).
50 See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 169-71 (1964);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-99 (1951).
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competition, may violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.51 Inso-
far as one of the alliance members may acquire a monopoly at a
certain airport or over a certain route as a result of the conduct,
the alliance may also violate section 2 of the Sherman Act. Ac-
cordingly, the government or a competing carrier may sue alli-
ance members under the federal antitrust laws by alleging
monopolization, an attempt to monopolize, or conspiracy to
monopolize an area of interstate or foreign air transportation,
as well as by alleging the existence of an unlawful contract, com-
bination, or conspiracy to restrain trade in interstate or foreign
51 See, e.g., United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Tex.
1977). In this criminal case, the DOJ charged defendant Braniff with various
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. See id. at 584-85 n.5. Although not
directed at an airline alliance, the indictment included many elements that could
just as easily be applied to one. See id. Moreover, a civil action could also mirror
the tone of the indictment. The indictment read in relevant part:
10. Air carrier service among the major Texas cities involves and
affects substantial amounts of interstate commerce ....
12. The aforesaid combination and conspiracy [between Braniff
and Texas International Airlines] has consisted of a continuing
agreement, understanding and concert of action among the de-
fendants and co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which have
been:
(a) to prevent and exclude Southwest [Airlines] from operating
as an air carrier among the major Texas cities;
(b) to impair the ability of Southwest to operate as an air
carrier....
13. In furtherance of the aforesaid combination and conspiracy,
the defendants ... :
(a) used tactics whose purpose and effect were to impede and
delay Southwest's entry as a competitor and to increase the cost of
such entry;
(b) exchanged and acted upon information regarding schedules,
fares and other matters in order to disadvantage and injure South-
west; and
(c) jointly undertook a boycott of Southwest by measures
designed to prevent passengers from cancelled Braniff and TI
flights ... from traveling on Southwest flights. ...
14. The aforesaid combination and conspiracy has had the follow-
ing effects, among others:
(a) Southwest's entry into the transportation of passengers by air
... was delayed;
(b) Southwest was denied the opportunity to compete freely in
the transportation of passengers by air . . . ;
(c) Competition generally in the transportation of passengers by
air ... has been unreasonably and arbitrarily suppressed; and
(d) The public has been denied the benefits of free and open
competition in the transportation of passengers by air among the
major Texas cities.
Id. at 585.
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air transportation.52 Rather than face the substantial penalties




The Department of Transportation may exempt intercarrier
cooperative agreements from the federal antitrust laws when "it
is required by the public interest. '54 However, the mere exist-
ence of any public benefit does not, by itself, require that the
DOT grant immunity. 55 Instead, the Department must consider
whether the agreement "is necessary to meet a serious transpor-
tation need or to achieve important public benefits (including
international comity and foreign policy considerations)," and
whether less anticompetitive alternatives are available. 56 Thus,
immunity is appropriate only "when antitrust litigation poses a
serious threat to the continued operation of an agreement that
produces important public benefits. ' 57 At any rate, the grant of
immunity is a defense to any suit under the federal antitrust laws
to the extent that the complained-of conduct was approved by
the DOT.58
An antitrust exemption must be secured in the precise man-
ner prescribed by Congress.5 9 Consequently, the grant of anti-
trust immunity is subject to certain limitations. To evaluate
whether behavior that allegedly violates the antitrust laws is ex-
pressly immunized, one must determine: (1) whether the con-
duct was approved by a specific order of the DOT or clearly
contemplated by such an order; and (2) that the DOT moni-
52 See, e.g., Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199, 203
(D.N.J. 1952), appeal dismissed, 204 F.2d 230, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953).
5- See Asra Q. Nomani, U.S. Aide's Drive to Make Airline Pacts Immune from Anti-
trust Laws is Assailed by Justice Agency, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1997, at A10. The DOT
has already granted immunity to the Delta-Swissair-Sabena-Austrian Airlines alli-
ance, the United-Lufthansa alliance, the KLM-Northwest alliance, and the Ameri-
can Airlines-Canadian Airlines alliance. See id. British Airways and American
Airlines have also applied for immunity. See id.; Charles Goldsmith, American Air-
lines, British Airways To File for Alliance, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1997, at B3A.
54 49 U.S.C. § 41308 (1994).
55 See Republic Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 756 F.2d 1304, 1317 (8th
Cir. 1985).
56 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b) (1) (A) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
57 Republic Airlines, 756 F.2d at 1317.
58 See Slick Airways, 107 F. Supp. at 209.
59 See United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226-27 (1940).
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tored and supervised the suspicious conduct."' In no event can
the DOT approve predatory conduct that has as its dominant
purpose the elimination of a competitor.6' Furthermore, the
DOT's grant of immunity applies only to conduct involving the
airline industry. 62 Consequently, the antitrust exemption for an
airline alliance would not apply beyond air travel if, for exam-
ple, the alliance members expanded into the hotel or ground
tour business.""
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN
ANTITRUST LAW
Before a court can adjudicate a claim, it must have jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter before it. In a typical antitrust case
involving two domestic carriers with an agreement regarding
business in the United States, there is little controversy over the
application of American antitrust law. However, in an interna-
tional airline alliance, where travel across international flight
routes, conduct in foreign hubs, and even flights between two
foreign cities can be part of allegedly anticompetitive effects in
the United States, the applicability of U.S. law is less certain. In
a private antitrust action, this lack of certainty can be the cause
of considerable controversy."4 In fact, few subjects in interna-
tional law are as controversial and highly disputed as the extra-
territorial application of U.S. antitrust law."5
60 See United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 724, 727 (W.D. Tex.
1978) (citing Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 387
(1973)). AccordScroggins v. Air Cargo, Inc., 534 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1976); Aloha
Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 489 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 913 (1974).
61 See Aloha Airlines, 489 F.2d at 211-12.
62 See Foremost Int'l Tours, Inc. v. Qantas Airways Ltd., 525 F.2d 281, 286 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
63 See id. at 285-86.
64 See infra notes 92-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of one such
case.
65 See Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The
United States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1992). De-
spite this controversy, the U.S. has increased its international enforcement efforts
in recent years. SeeJohn R. Wilke, Hunting Cartels: U.S. Trust-Busters Increasingly
Target International Business, WALL. Sr. J., Feb. 5, 1997, at Al.
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A. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Initially, American courts were reluctant to give the antitrust
laws effect beyond the United States's geographic boundaries.66
The first major change came in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America,67 in which Judge Learned Hand concluded that Ameri-
can antitrust law permitted the regulation of certain conduct
outside the United States, since "any state may impose liabilities,
even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside
its borders that has consequences within its borders which the
state reprehends. 6 8
Judge Hand analyzed three different scenarios. First, the
mere effect on imports and exports to or from the United States
is insufficient grounds for the extension ofjurisdiction when an
agreement is made outside the United States by parties who do
not intend to affect U.S. commerce.69 Second, jurisdiction is
also improper if parties outside the United States form an agree-
ment with the intent to unlawfully inhibit U.S. commerce, and
yet do not actually achieve their desired effect.70 Finally, the
only scenario under which Judge Hand found that the U.S. anti-
trust laws properly have extraterritorial effect is where a foreign
agreement is both intended to affect U.S. commerce and its per-
formance is shown to actually have had that effect.
7
'
Alcoa's "effects test" caused a significant expansion of antitrust
jurisdiction.72 Courts usually interpret Alcoa to mean that the
activities of foreigners within a foreign territory may still be gov-
erned by U.S. antitrust law, so long as intent and effect on U.S.
commerce exist.73 Nevertheless, "no subsequent decision has
applied the . . . [effects] test to exclusively foreign conduct of
foreign parties. Instead, cases dealing principally with foreign
activities have continued to emphasize participation by an Amer-
ican party. '74 Parties to an international airline alliance, particu-
66 See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (re-
fusing to extend the Sherman Act to conduct occurring outside the United
States). But see United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927)
(distinguishing American Banana and allowing the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law under a narrow set of circumstances).
67 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.).
68 Id. at 443.
- See id.
70 See id. at 443-44.
71 See id. at 444.
72 See ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 40, at 918.
73 See id. at 919.
74 Id.
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larly one involving an American airline, should be aware of Alcoa
and its implications.
By the late 1970s, foreign commentators vehemently con-
tested Alcoa as conflicting "with international law, comity, and
good judgment. ' 75 Domestic commentators also expressed un-
certainty over the extent of the effects test.76 Concerned with
issues of international comity, the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane I
modified the Alcoa test by balancing the relevant considerations
of each case, thereby adopting a 'jurisdictional rule of reason. 77
Numerous commentators praised this jurisdictional rule of
reason as a necessary limitation on the 'jurisdictional excesses
arising from" Alcoa.78 Under the rule, courts should consider:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality
or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places
of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by
either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative
significance of effects on the United States as compared with
those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to
harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such
effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of
conduct within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad. A court evaluating these factors should identify the po-
tential degree of conflict if American authority is asserted ....
Having assessed the conflict, the court should then determine
whether in the face of it the contacts and interests of the United
States are sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction."
B. FOREIGN TRADE ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT
Some circuits expressly rejected the Timberlane I test,s°
whereas other circuits openly embraced it. s" Consequently,
75 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 610 (9th Cir. 1977)
[hereinafter Timberlane 1].
76 See id.
77 Id. at 612-14.
78 ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 40, at 923.
79 Timberlane 1, 549 F.2d at 614-15 (footnote omitted).
80 See, e.g., National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 8-9
(2d Cir. 1981).
81 See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir.
1979). The Mannington Mills court put its own spin on Timberlane I, enunciating
10 factors a court should weigh:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
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Congress passed the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1982 (FTAIA), 2 in part to address the inconsistent treatment
in the various circuits.83 Under the FTAIA, the Sherman Act
does not apply to trade or commerce with foreign nations,
unless:
1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foresee-
able effect-
A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with
foreign nations; or
B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations,
of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United
States; and
2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of [the
Sherman Act] .4
This provision explicitly applies to the transportation industry.85
Thus, in order for a court to have the requisite subject matter
jurisdiction over an international antitrust claim, the alleged an-
ticompetitive action must have a "direct, substantial, and reason-
ably foreseeable effect" on domestic commerce, import trade, or
export trade of an American party, regardless of whether the
anticompetitive conduct occurred in the United States.86 Con-
sequently, courts will likely dismiss a plaintiffs antitrust claims if
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here
compared to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation
there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and
its foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises ju-
risdiction and grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the posi-
tion of being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or
be under conflicting requirements by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country
if made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the
issue.
Id. at 1297-98.
82 Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246 (1982) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.).
83 See McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 814 n.8.
84 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994).
85 See id. § 4002(a) (2).
86 McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 815 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6a(l)(A)).
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they only involve foreign commerce without the requisite do-
mestic effect.87 In an airline alliance, the FTAIA appears to ex-
tend subject matter jurisdiction to foreign airlines operating in
the United States, but not to foreign airlines suffering injury in a
foreign state in which the anticompetitive conduct involved ser-
vice between two foreign cities.
C. LAKEz AIRWAYS
In response to the extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised by
American courts, many foreign countries have passed blocking
or "clawback" statutes.8" Often targeting the treble damage pro-
visions of the Clayton Act, these statutes prohibit corporations
from cooperating with other countries' courts under various
conditions. 9 Though largely symbolic, 90 a British blocking stat-
ute became the focus of an infamous international airline anti-
trust case: Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines.9"
Laker Airways, a foreign carrier nearing bankruptcy, brought
an antitrust action in a United States district court against four
domestic and four foreign companies, alleging that they con-
spired to set rates at a predatory level in order to drive Laker
Airways out of its transatlantic flight business.92 Invoking the
British blocking statute, several of the foreign defendants
quickly obtained a preliminary injunction in the English High
Court of Justice prohibiting Laker Airways from taking any fur-
ther action in U.S. court against the foreign defendants.9 To
prevent the American defendants from following this course of
action, Laker first obtained a restraining order from the district
87 See id.; accord McElderry v. Cathay Pac. Airways, Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 1071, 1077
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
88 See ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 40, at 931-32.
89 See, e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (Eng.); Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act of 1984, R.S.C., ch. 49 (1985) (Can.); Foreign Anti-
trustJudgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act, 1979, No. 13 (Austl.). Other
countries that have enacted similar statutes include France, Germany, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, and South Africa. See RALPH H. FoL-
SOM, EUROPEAN COMMUNIY BUSINESS LAW 345-48 (1994).
See ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 40, at 932.
731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
92 See id. at 917. The domestic companies included Pan American World Air-
ways, Trans World Airlines, McDonnell Douglas Corp., and McDonnell Douglas
Finance Corp. See id. The foreign companies included British Airways, British
Caledonian Airways, Lufthansa, and Swissair. See id.
"1 See id. at 918. The English Court of Appeal then issued a permanent injunc-
tion. See id. See also British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1983] 3 All E.R.
375, 377.
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court. 4 Laker then filed a second antitrust suit in the United
States against KLM and Sabena, both of whom the court en-
joined from using the foreign courts to block the litigation.9 5
The D.C. Circuit had the unenviable task of resolving this con-
flict. The court reasoned that the United States had sufficient
jurisdiction under Alcoa and its progeny because the controversy
involved flights to and from the United States. 6 Furthermore,
the intent to affect U.S. commerce was clear because the alleged
predatory pricing scheme was designed specifically to drive
Laker Airways out of the market.97 If Laker Airways' allegations
were true, the requisite "intended and actual effect in the
United States" would be present because Laker Airways was
eventually forced into liquidation. 8 Thus, the United States
could indeed exercise subject matter jurisdiction.99
The court also addressed the competing interests of the
United States and the United Kingdom. In passing the FITAIA,
Congress had an opportunity to clarify the applicability of Amer-
ican antitrust laws to international commerce, but Congress did
not alter the ability of courts "to exercise comity or otherwise
recognize the peculiar problems associated with antitrust ac-
tions involving international transactions.""1 ' Consequently, the
court declined to perform an international interest balancing
test.' 0' The court decided that the English injunction was not
entitled to international comity.102 It observed that the "English
injunction is purely offensive [and not intended to] protect Eng-
lish jurisdiction," but rather was granted "to quash the practical
power of the United States courts" out of different national as-
sessments of the desirability of antitrust law. '0 3 The entire Laker
Airways suit was therefore allowed to proceed.'0 4
94 See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 918.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 916, 94546.
97 See id. at 925.
98 Id. at 955-56.
99 See id. at 956.
100 Id. at 946 n.137.
101 See id. at 948-50. "This court is ill-equipped to 'balance the vital national
interests of the United States and the [United Kingdom] to determine which
interests predominate."' Id. at 950 (quoting In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation,
480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1978)) (alteration in original).
102 See id. at 938.
103 Id.
104 See id. at 956. Eventually, the British House of Lords withdrew the English
Court of Appeals' injunction. See British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd.,
[1984] 3 All E.R. 39, 40.
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Laker Airways illustrates one example of "foreign resistance to
the assertions of United States antitrust jurisdiction."' 5 One
commentator has observed that the D.C. Circuit decision was a
necessary affirmation of the United States' right to properly ad-
judicate an antitrust suit without foreign interference.106 While
the result in Laker Airways was not controversial, the court's ra-
tionale and its rejection of any kind of balancing test was.10 7
Thus, foreign commentators may view this decision as "another
example of United States antitrust provincialism and
zealotry."'
D. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES
The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States()9 have tried to synthesize the current
case law and provide solutions to the dilemma of extraterritorial
enforcement of U.S. law. "0 A common theme in the Restatement
(Third) is reasonableness.' 1 ' Section 402 contains the general
rules regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction and provides that a
state may prohibit conduct or activity that "wholly or in substan-
tial part, takes place within its territory."' 1 2 A state may also reg-
ulate conduct that occurs outside its territory as long as the
conduct substantially affects the state's interests or relations
within its territory.' Most notably, a state may also regulate
conduct outside its territory by persons who are not its nationals
if their conduct somehow affects the security of the state or its
interests."I4 Therefore, in addition to endorsing nationality, ter-
ritoriality, and protective principles, the Restatement (Third) also
adopts an effects test. 15
105 C. Paul Rogers III, Still Running Against the Wind: Comment on Antitrust Juris-
diction and Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 50 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 931, 966 (1985).
106 See id.
107 See id. at 967.
108 Id.
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
l0 Although it is somewhat theoretical, courts are sometimes inclined to con-
sider the Restatement in their analysis of international disputes. See, e.g., Laker Air-
ways, 731 F.2d at 952-53 nn.165-69, 172.
"I See Alford, supra note 65, at 23.
112 RESTATEMENr (THIRD), supra note 109, § 402(1)(a).
113 See id. § 402(1)(c)-(2).
- See id. § 402(3).
115 See Alford, supra note 65, at 24.
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Nevertheless, section 403 serves to limit section 402.116 Even
if the requirements of jurisdiction under section 402 are satis-
fied, a state is still prohibited from applying its laws if doing so
would be unreasonable. 117 Reasonableness is determined by
evaluating eight broad criteria." 18 Although the test for reasona-
bleness may be met, a conflict with the legitimate exercise of
jurisdiction of another state may still arise. In such a case, each
state would have an obligation to weigh its own interests against
those of its counterpart.1 9 The state with the lesser interest
should yield to the state with the "clearly greater" interest.'
2 0
The Restatement (Third) is of little help, however, as to what the
proper procedure would be when two states cannot agree upon
whose interest is "clearly greater."'21
Although sections 402 and 403 lay out the general framework
for the extraterritorial application of a state's law, section 415
specifically addresses issues that are unique to the enforcement
of U.S. antitrust law in international transactions.122 The exer-
cise of extraterritorial antitrustjurisdiction is proper if an agree-
ment in restraint of trade is made or "carried out in significant
116 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 109, § 403.
117 See id. § 403(1).
118 Section 403(2) lists the eight factors that one must weigh:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e.,
the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or
has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic
activity ... ;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected
or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the tradi-
tions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regu-
lating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
See id. § 403(3).
120 Id.
121 See id. § 403 cmt. e (suggesting that in this situation "states often attempt to
eliminate the conflict so as to reduce international friction and avoid putting
those who are the object of the regulations in a difficult situation").
122 See id. § 415.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
measure in the United States," irrespective of the parties' na-
tionalities.1 2' For conduct occurring largely outside the United
States, jurisdiction is still proper if the "principal purpose of the
[suspicious] conduct or agreement is to interfere with [or have
some effect on] the commerce" inside the United States. 124
Under both scenarios, the extension of jurisdiction must still be
reasonable. 125 Presumably, one can turn to the eight factors in
section 403(2) to make this determination. The Restatement
(Third) thus allows 'Jurisdiction... based on territoriality or the
effects doctrine."' 126
E. 1995 DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
Because U.S. enforcement authorities have recognized that
commerce between U.S. and foreign companies involves issues
of concurrentjurisdiction, the Department ofJustice (DOJ) and
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have formulated enforce-
ment guidelines for interested parties. The newest guidelines
place a greater emphasis than their predecessors on an "interest
in international cooperation."' 127 The guidelines also have four-
teen illustrative examples that apply the various antitrust laws to
hypothetical situations in international commerce. These exam-
ples are particularly helpful because they include insight into
how the agencies will respond to a particular situation. How-
ever, the government is quick to caution that:
123 Id. § 415(1).
124 Id. § 415(2).
125 See id. § 415(3).
126 Alford, supra note 65, at 25.
127 See ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 40, supp. at 84. Additionally, the DOJ
has stated that:
Although the federal antitrust laws have always applied to foreign
commerce, that application is particularly important today.
Throughout the world, the importance of antitrust law as a means
to ensure open and free markets, protect consumers, and prevent
conduct that impedes competition is becoming more apparent ....
[T] he federal agencies charged with the responsibility of enforcing
the antitrust laws . . .have made it a high priority to enforce the
antitrust laws with respect to international operations and to coop-
erate wherever appropriate with foreign authorities regarding such
enforcement. In furtherance of this priority, the Agencies have re-
vised and updated the [DOJ] 's 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guide-
lines for International Operations, which are hereby withdrawn.
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 13,107, at 20,589-2 (Apr. 5, 1995) [hereinafter Antitrust
Guidelines].
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As is the case with all guidelines, users should rely on qualified
counsel to assist them in evaluating the antitrust risk associated
with any contemplated transaction or activity.... Persons seeking
more specific advance statements of enforcement intentions with
respect to the matters treated in these Guidelines should use the
[DOJ]'s Business Review procedure ....128
IV. DEFENSES TO THE APPLICATION OF
AMERICAN LAW
A. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) 129 gov-
erns "[t]he scope of immunity of a foreign government or its
agencies and instrumentalities . . .from the jurisdiction of the
U.S. courts for all causes of action, including antitrust.""13 Many
carriers outside the United States are owned, at least in part, by
their respective national governments. 3' Therefore, an airline
owned by a foreign government might claim sovereign immu-
nity to U.S. antitrust laws. 132 A foreign government is immune
from suit in the United States... unless it has waived its immu-
nity, engaged in a commercial activity in the United States,
taken property in violation of international law, acquired rights
to U.S. property, committed certain torts within the United
States, or agreed to arbitration.' 34
The commercial activities exception is frequently invoked as
an exception to sovereign immunity in order to allow a suit
against a foreign government to continue in the United
128 Id. (citation omitted).
129 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1602-1605 (1994)).
130 Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 127, at 20,589-14.
131 See Simons, supra note 1, at 860-61. Many European airlines, including Luf-
thansa, Sabena, Swissair, Alitalia, and Air France are at various stages in the pro-
cess of privatization. See id.
132 See Forsythe v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 885 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir.
1989) (concluding that Saudi Arabian Airlines was an agency or instrumentality
of Saudi Arabia under FSIA). The courts have not resolved conclusively the ex-
tent of sovereign immunity when the foreign government owns less than 100% of
the airline. See generally Michael M. Baylson & Clare Ann Fitzgerald, Courts Disa-
gree on the Extent to Which the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Permits Pooling of Inter-
ests and Tiering of Subsidiaries by Foreign Governments, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 3, 1997, at B7.
133 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
134 See id. § 1605(a).
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States.' 5 Under the FSIA, a foreign government is not immune
when
the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States.136
To determine whether an activity is commercial or sovereign,
courts usually examine whether the challenged conduct is ordi-
narily performed for profit and whether the conduct is of a type
that only a sovereign government can perform.1 37  Conse-
quently, most activities of a foreign government-owned airline
flying in U.S. airspace will be subject to U.S. antitrust laws to the
same extent as its privately owned counterparts. 13 Thus, by fly-
ing in and out of the United States, the foreign defendants in
Laker Airways implicitly waived any possible objections to the use
of United States law insofar as it may have conflicted with any
foreign sovereign immunity.'3 "
B. ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The act of state doctrine is a rule of judicial abstention that
balances international comity and separation of powers.14 It ap-
plies only if the specific conduct complained of is a public act of
a foreign government within its own territorial jurisdiction and
relates to its governmental sovereignty. 4' Therefore, the doc-
trine only arises when a U.S. court must adjudicate the official
act of a foreign sovereign. 4 2 U.S. courts are understandably re-
135 See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 127, at 20,589-14.
'"1 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994).
17 See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 127, at 20,589-14 (citations omitted).
138 See id.
139 See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 925
(D.C. Cir. 1984). In fact, the foreign defendants chose not to invoke the defense
at all. See id. at 942.
14) See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 127, at 20,589-16 (citing Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-22 n.21 (1964)).
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luctant to adjudicate cases that would require them to evaluate
the legality of the sovereign act of a foreign state. 14 3
The act of state doctrine is relevant in an airline alliance when
a restraint of trade arises directly from the act of a foreign sover-
eign. For example, the controversial act might include the
grant of a license, the award of a contract, or the expropriation
of property.144 The U.S. government may refrain from bringing
an enforcement action based on the act of state doctrine. Ac-
cordingly, the DOJ usually will not challenge "foreign acts of
state if the facts and circumstances indicate that: (1) the spe-
cific conduct complained of is a public act of the sovereign, (2)
the act was taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the sover-
eign, and (3) the matter is governmental, rather than commer-
cial."' 45 Because these criteria were not satisfied, the foreign
defendants in Laker Airways chose not to invoke the act of state
doctrine.'46
C. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN COMPULSION
An international airline may find itself subject to conflicting
requirements when U.S. law differs from the law of other coun-
tries, as is common with antitrust regulations.'47 The Supreme
Court has held that when it is possible to satisfy both the foreign
law and the U.S. antitrust laws, the foreign law does not excuse
actions that violate U.S. law.'48 Conversely, a direct conflict may
arise when a foreign law requires behavior that the U.S. antitrust
laws proscribe.' 49 The DOJ may in this case recognize a foreign
sovereign compulsion defense to U.S. antitrust law.15°
Nevertheless, the DOJ will only recognize this defense under
very narrow circumstances. First, the foreign government must
order the anticompetitive behavior under circumstances in
which refusal to comply with the foreign government's com-
mand would involve the imposition of criminal or other punitive
143 See id. (citing International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v.
OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982)).
144 See id.
145 Id.
146 See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 942.
47 See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 127, at 20,589-14 to 20,589-15 (citations
omitted).
148 See id. at 20,589-15 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764
(1993)).
1,1, See id. at 20,589-15.
150 See id. (citing Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo Inc., 307
F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970)).
495
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
sanctions. 15' Second, the U.S. government will not recognize
the defense if the conduct occurs solely in the United States. 52
Finally, the federal government will not recognize the defense if
the anticompetitive behavior would otherwise fall under the
FSIA commercial activity exception. 51
D. NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE
To facilitate the complex process that accompanies an inter-
national joint venture, partners typically lobby their respective
legislatures or administrative agencies. For example, in an inter-
national airline alliance, the carriers may push for an open skies
agreement between their respective governments. At first
glance, such activities may themselves appear to be prohibited
anticompetitive behavior. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme
Court has concluded that such efforts to influence government
entities are generally immune from antitrust scrutiny.1 54
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is applicable even if action is
intended to destroy competition or is part of a larger scheme
that violates the antitrust laws. 1 55 The doctrine is based on con-
stitutional free speech protections 5" and applies to all lobbying
efforts, irrespective of the branch of government lobbied. 157
The doctrine has also been extended to include joint efforts to
influence foreign governments. 15  However, the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine does not protect a defendant who, while en-
gaged in private commercial activities, conspires with the agency
151 See id.
152 See id. (citing Linseman v. World Hockey Assoc., 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1325
(D. Conn. 1977)).
153 See id. See also supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
154 See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1961); East-
ern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
155 See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 669-70.
156 See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-
12 (1972).
157 See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136 (extending protection to legislative and executive
lobbying); Pennington, 381 U.S. at 669-70 (following Noerr); California Motor, 404
U.S. at 510-11 (extending protection to lobbying of administrative agencies and
judicial bodies).
158 See Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1366 (5th Cir. 1983).
But see Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), affd per curiam on other grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 950 (1972).
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of a foreign government to restrain competition in foreign
commerce. 159
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine may also affect airline anti-
trust litigation when that litigation is itself part of an alleged ac-
tion in contravention of the antitrust laws. In United States v.
Braniff Airways, Inc.,'6 ° the DOJ charged defendant Braniff with
several antitrust violations, including instituting "a pattern of liti-
gation ... that was repetitive, inconsistent, undertaken without
regard to the merits, with knowledge of its adverse impact, and
with the intent to harass, injure, or destroy Southwest [Air-
lines]."161 Braniff invoked the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in de-
fense of these alleged activities."32 The court left the ultimate
resolution of this issue to the subsequent trial, but it noted that
if litigation is used as part of a plan to destroy competition, then
the litigation can lose its First Amendment protection. 6- Conse-
quently, the plaintiff is at least entitled to an opportunity at trial
to prove the extent to which the defendant's actions exceed the
law. 16 4
V. CONTROL OF AIRLINE ALLIANCES IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Authorities within the European Union are quick to scrutinize
airline alliances that may have an impact on European air
travel.1 65 Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty1 66 provide the gen-
eral framework for antitrust regulation in the European Union.
Neither article, however, explicitly addresses mergers or joint
ventures.167 To fill this gap, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) assumed an activist role, invoking Articles 85 and 86 to
159 See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
707-08 (1962).
160 453 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
161 Id. at 730.
162 See id.
163 See id. at 731.
164 See id.
165 See Bentley, supra note 13, at B1. The recent difficulty with European regu-
lators that Boeing experienced in trying to clear its merger with McDonnell
Douglas is further evidence of the growing role that the European Union now
plays in the international business arena. See Jeff Cole et al., Boeing-McDonnell
Merger Clears Hurdle as Europeans Give Tentative Clearance, WALL ST. J., July 24,
1997, at A2.
166 TRATV ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY, Feb. 7, 1992, arts. 85-86,
O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC TREATY].
167 See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EC LAw: TEXT, CASES, & MATERIALS
978 (1995).
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cover mergers under narrow sets of circumstances." 8 The un-
certainty of the ECJ's case law, as well as the basic need for a
comprehensive merger regulation, led to the final passage in
December 1989 of Regulation 4064/89 (the "Merger Regula-
tion"), which took effect in September 1990.169 Depending on
how an international airline alliance is structured, it will be eval-
uated under either the Merger Regulation or Article 85. Gener-
ally speaking, most airline alliances are still scrutinized under
the latter.
A. MERGER REGULATION
The Mergers Task Force within the European Commission
has the authority to administer the Merger Regulation. 7 ' The
Merger Regulation applies to all "concentrations" that have a
"community dimension." '71 A concentration exists when "two
or more previously independent undertakings merge."' 11 2 A
concentration also exists when one or more undertakings ac-
quire, by any means, direct or indirect control of all or part of
one or more undertakings. 173 The community dimension prong
is satisfied when the aggregate worldwide profits of all the un-
dertakings is more than ECU 5 billion (approximately $6.25 bil-
lion) and the aggregate community-wide profit is more than
ECU 250 million (approximately $312 million), unless more
than two-thirds of the aggregate community-wide profit is in
only one Member State. 174 Once all of these criteria are satis-
I- See id. at 978-79 (citingJoined Cases 142 and 156/84, British American To-
bacco Co. v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4487).
''3 See id. at 979; Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentra-
tions Between Undertakings, 1989 OJ. (L 395) 1, amended by 1990 OJ. (L 257) 14
[hereinafter Merger Regulation]. The name is somewhat deceptive because the
Merger Regulation also covers certain joint ventures.
170 See CIc; & DE BURCA, supra note 167, at 981; Merger Regulation, supra
note 169, art. 2.
171 See Merger Regulation, supra note 169, art. 1 (1).
172 Id. art. 3(1)(a). In European parlance, an undertaking can be any entity
engaged in commercial activity, including a corporation, an individual, a trade
association, a state-owned company, or a cooperative. See CRAIG & DE BURCA,
supra note 167, at 889 (citations omitted).
173 See Merger Regulation, supra note 169, art. 3(1)(b).
'74 See id. art. 1(2). At the time this Comment went to press, the EU regulatory
bodies were considering several measures that would reduce significantly these
threshold amounts. The Council recently adopted Council Regulation 1310/97,
which amends the Merger Regulation and takes effect on March 1, 1998. See
generally John Grayston, EU Megamerger Approval Process Set to Improve, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 27, 1997, at B7.
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fled, the Commission evaluates whether the concentration has
any anticompetitive effects on the common market. 175
Inevitably, conflicts will arise between application of the
Merger Regulation and a Member State's own antitrust laws.
The Merger Regulation handles such conflicts by instituting a
principle of "one-stop shopping. "176 If the Merger Regulation's
threshold criteria are satisfied, then only the Commission
should scrutinize the transaction. 7 7 Otherwise, a Member State
is free to apply its own law to mergers having only a national
effect. 78 This system works best when there are effects in more
than one Member State, since the Commission can scrutinize
the competitive effects on the whole community. 179
Transactions involving joint control raise many questions as to
what extent the Merger Regulation applies to joint ventures
such as those involved in international airline alliances.18 ° Arti-
cle 3(2) addresses this issue in cryptic form. A cooperative joint
venture, where two undertakings remain independent but coor-
dinate competitive behavior, is excluded from coverage under
the Merger Regulation. 8' On the other hand, the Merger Reg-
175 See id. art. 2.
In making this appraisal, the Commission shall take into account:
(a) the need to maintain and develop effective competition within
the common market in view of, among other things, the structure
of all the markets concerned and the actual or potential competi-
tion from undertakings located either within or outwith [sic] the
Community;
(b) the market position of the undertakings concerned and their
economic and financial power, the alternatives available to suppli-
ers and users, their access to supplies or markets, any legal or other
barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods
and services, the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consum-
ers, and the development of technical and economic progress pro-
vided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an
obstacle to competition.
Id. art. 2(1).
176 See CRAiG & DE BURCA, supra note 167, at 1000.
177 See id. (citing Merger Regulation, supra note 169, arts. 9, 21.).
178 See Mario Siragusa, Merger Control and State Aids Panel: Merger Control in the
European Community, 9 CoNN.J. INT'L L. 535, 547 (1994). The necessity for review
of mergers and joint ventures by national authorities when the Merger Regula-
tion's threshold is not satisfied has triggered an explosion of national merger
control laws. These national laws vary widely in both their substantive and proce-
dural requirements. See id.
179 See id.
180 See CRAiG & DE BURCA, supra note 167, at 984.
181 See Merger Regulation, supra note 169, art. 3(2). However, cooperative
joint ventures may still be subjected to analysis under Article 85 of the EC Treaty.
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ulation does cover a concentrative joint venture, which is essen-
tially its own autonomous economic entity. 182 Thus, "only those
joint ventures that will independently and permanently perform
all of the functions of an autonomous economic entity," without
"coordination of the competitive behavior of the parties
amongst themselves or between them and the joint venture,"
will constitute a concentration. 18 3
Ajoint venture airline alliance does not seem to fit the defini-
tion of a covered concentrative joint venture.184 Instead, that
type of airline alliance will likely be scrutinized under the com-
petition laws in the EC Treaty. 81 Conversely, the Merger Regu-
lation seems to apply when one carrier acquires the assets of
another. 1"" To determine compatibility with the common mar-
ket, the Commission weighs "market share resulting from the
concentration and the importance of the other competitors in
the market [and whether] the proposed concentration .. .cre-
182 See Merger Regulation, supra note 169, art. 3(2).
183 Siragusa, supra note 178, at 551.
184 To help clarify the treatment given to joint ventures, the Commission has
issued a Notice on the distinction between concentrative and cooperative joint
ventures. See Commission Notice on the Distinction Between Concentrative and
Cooperative Joint Ventures Under Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control
of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1994 OJ. (C 385) 1. This Notice goes
into considerable detail on the elements ofjoint control, structure, cooperation,
product market, and geographic markets. See id. 10-20. It also includes exam-
ples and citations to relevant case law. See id.
185 See Commission Notice Concerning the Assessment of Cooperative Joint
Ventures Pursuant to Article 85 of the [EEC] Treaty, 1993 O.J. (C 43) 2 4, 11.
Three types of cooperative joint ventures can be scrutinized under the European
Union's conventional antitrust law, Article 85:
" allJVs, the activities of which are not to be performed on a last-
ing basis, especially those limited in advance by the parents to a
short time period,
• JVs which do not perform all the functions of an autonomous
economic entity, especially those charged by their parents sim-
ply with the operation of particular functions of an undertaking
(partial-function JVs),
" JVs which perform all the functions of an autonomous eco-
nomic entity (full-functionJVs) where they give rise to coordina-
tion of competitive behaviour by the parents in relation to each
other or to the JV.
Id. 10. See also infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
An alliance under the British Airways-American Airlines model seems to have
all the characteristics of a partial-function joint venture.
186 See, e.g., Commission Decision of Sept. 13, 1991, Declaring a Concentration
to Be Compatible with the Common Market, 1991 O.J. (C 289) 14. There, the
Commission approved Delta's purchase of bankrupt Pan Am's North Atlantic-
European operations.
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ate[s] or strengthen[s] a dominant position."'18 7 If competition
in the EU is not significantly impeded by an alliance, the Com-
mission will likely approve it.188
Any transaction with a community dimension, including con-
centrative joint ventures, must be reported to the Commission
within one week of the conclusion of the agreement. 189 Failure
to comply with the duty to notify the Commission (or intention-
ally or negligently supplying false or misleading information re-
garding the transaction) is punishable by a fine of up to ECU
50,000 (approximately $62,500).' 1 0 Airline alliance members
therefore have a considerable incentive to comply with the
Merger Regulation, if it is applicable to their alliance.
Furthermore, the Commission has broad investigative powers
under the Merger Regulation, including the ability to request
information,' 9 ' to examine or copy books and other business
records, 19 2 to ask "for oral explanations on the spot,"' 93 and to
conduct on-site investigations.' 94 Finally, the Commission also
has broad powers to levy fines for noncompliance or failure to
cooperate during the investigative process.19
B. COMPETITION LAw UNDER THE EC TRvTY
Airline alliances that fall outside the scope of the Merger Reg-
ulation are governed by Article 85's residual jurisdiction.'96 Ar-
ticle 85 prohibits "all agreements between undertakings [i.e.,
firms or enterprises], decisions by associations of undertakings,
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Mem-
ber States and which have as their object or effect the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition within the common
market" unless the undertaking improves "the production or
distribution of goods or" promotes "technical or economic pro-
gress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting ben-
187 Id.
188 See id.
189 See Merger Regulation, supra note 169, art. 4(1).
190 See id. art. 14(1).
19, See id. art. 11.
192 See id. art. 13(1)(a),(b).
193 Id. art. 13(1)(c).
194 See id. art. 13(1)(d).
195 See id. art. 14.
196 See Michael Reynolds & Elizabeth Weightman, European Economic Commu-
nity, in INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 3, 4 (J. William Rowley
& Donald I. Baker eds., 1991).
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efit .... ",97 Article 85 is substantively very similar to the
American scheme of antitrust regulation.'" s Furthermore, since
the Merger Regulation does not govern concentrative joint ven-
tures, Article 85 may limit joint venture airline alliances, as well
as those joint equity alliances where one airline acquires a ma-
jority share in another.'99
Article 86 prohibits "[a] ny abuse by one or more undertak-
ings of a dominant position within the common market.., in so
far as it may affect trade between member-States. '2°° An abuse is
likely to occur through an airline alliance if a dominant airline
strengthens its position and the result is a reduction in competi-
tion. 21 l Although there is no set rule, a dominant position gen-
erally exists once a carrier obtains a market share in excess of
forty percent.211
2
Articles 88 and 89 provide temporary arrangements in the ab-
sence of appropriate regulations implementing the competition
provisions of the EC Treaty. 2°3 To date, the Council of Ministers
has not implemented regulations for air service outside the Eu-
ropean Union, though it has done so for air transport within the
EU. 2°4 Each Member State has a duty to determine whether an
international alliance not covered by an implementing regula-
tion is prohibited by Articles 85 and 86.205
Article 89 also lays out a procedure for cooperation between a
Member State and the Commission in conducting an investiga-
tion.21 1' Because the procedure is rather vague, it can often lead
to controversy. For instance, in the ongoing feud between the
U.K. and the European Commission over the legality of the Brit-
ish Airways/American Airlines alliance, the EU Competition
Commissioner has remarked that British approval of the alli-
ance would "constitute a failure of the U.K. to fulfill its duty of
cooperation" under Article 89.207
1.17 EC TRFAIN, supra note 166, arts. 85 (1), (3).
198 See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
1I' See Reynolds & Weightman, supra note 196, at 4.
201 EC TRArx, supra note 166, art. 86.
211 See Reynolds & Weightman, supra note 196, at 4.
202 See id.
203 See EC TREATY, supra note 166, arts. 88-89.
214 See infra notes 212-24 and accompanying text.
205 See EC TREArY, supra note 166, arts. 87-88.
'206 See id. art. 89.
207 Paul Ames, EU Threatens Britain with Lawsuit over BA-American Airlines Alli-
ance, AP, Jan. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4851577 (quoting EU Competition
Commissioner Karel Van Miert).
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Attorneys familiar with the European Union's antitrust investi-
gative process have mixed reactions to it. One attorney de-
scribed the process as "a colossal paper chase. 2 °8 On the other
hand, the process has also been described as "more user
friendly-it's easier to find out what they're really concerned
about-while the American procedures are more of a sterile
economic exercise. 2 0 9 At any rate, U.S. attorneys should be
aware that in a Commission investigation, the EU does not rec-
ognize any attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel. 210 Fur-
thermore, the attorney-client privilege does apply to outside
counsel, but only if the attorney is qualified to practice in the
European Union. l
C. REGULATION OF AIR TRANSPORTATION
The Council adopted its first "package" of measures that gov-
ern air transportation in 1987.212 The measures explicitly re-
strict themselves to apply only to international air transport
between EU airports. 213 Flights between airports within a Mem-
ber State and those between a Member State and a non-member
country are excluded. However, the ECJ has ruled that the
Commission can regulate anticompetitive behavior of European
208 Bentley, supra note 13, at BI (quoting Robert Peters, Deputy General Coun-
sel, Imperial Chemical Industries PLC).
209 Id. (quoting Ted Killheffer, Associate General Counsel, E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co.).
210 See id. at B2.
211 See id. As the EU relaxes its regulations and begins allowing American attor-
neys more leeway to practice in Europe, this will likely change.
212 See Council Regulation 3975/87 Laying Down the Procedure for the Appli-
cation of the Rules on Competition to Undertakings in the Air Transport Sector,
1987 OJ. (L 374) 1, as amended, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 18; Council Regulation 3976/
87 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of
Agreements and Concerted Practices in the Air Transport Sector, 1987 OJ. (L
374) 9, as amended, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 19; Council Directive 87/601 on Fares for
Scheduled Air Services Between Member States, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 12; Council
Decision 87/602 on the Sharing of Passenger Capacity between Air Carriers on
Scheduled Air Services Between Member States and on Access for Air Carriers to
Scheduled Air-Service Routes Between Member States, 1987 OJ. (L 374) 19. For
a more detailed discussion of all three aviation liberalization packages, see Benoit
MJ. Swinnen, Comment, An Opportunity For Trans-Atlantic Civil Aviation: From
Open Skies to Open Markets, 63J. AIR L. & CoM. 249 (1997).
213 See Council Regulation 3975/87, supra note 212, art. 1(2); Council Regula-
tion 3976/87, supra note 212, art. 1; Council Directive 87/601, supra note 212,
art. 1; Council Decision 87/602, supra note 212, art. 1.
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airlines not only under it aviation rules, but also under its com-
petition rules."14
Regulation 3975/87 empowers the Commission to investigate
and sanction any inter-carrier agreements that violate Articles 85
and 86.215 This regulation also contains several provisions relat-
ing to collaboration between the Commission and the authori-
ties in the Member States in an investigation, and establishes
fines and periodic penalty payments for violators.2 16 Finally,
Regulation 3975/87 details a special "objections" procedure,
whereby undertakings and associations of undertakings can ap-
ply for antitrust immunity.
2 1 7
Directive 87/601 establishes criteria for the approval of air
fares by authorities in the Member States.21 8 It also establishes
procedures for air carriers to submit air fares for approval.
219
The directive is based on the idea that air carriers should be free
to propose air fares individually or after consultation with other
air carriers for the specific purpose of fixing the terms of inter-
carrier agreements. 20
Similarly, Regulation 3976/87 allows the Commission to ex-
empt other agreements and concerted practices from Article
85.22 1 The preamble states that this regulation is structured with
the observation that the air transport sector is governed by a
network of international agreements, bilateral agreements be-
tween states, and bilateral and multilateral agreements between
carriers.222 Consequently, Regulation 3976/87 allows gradual
changes to the system that ensure increased competition, while
at the same time allowing the air transport sector to adapt.
223
214 See Cases 209-213/84, Ministere Public v. Lucas Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. 1425.
215 See Council Regulation 3975/87, supra note 212, arts. 3-8.
216 See id. arts. 8-18.
217 See id. arts. 5-7.
218 See Council Directive 87/601, supra note 212, arts. 3-7.
219 See id. art. 4.
22) See id. pmbl. Under the U.S. antitrust laws, such an agreement setting
prices is usually per se illegal, unless the DOT grants an exemption. See, e.g.,
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 395-402 (1927); United
States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940). See also United
States v. American Airlines, 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984) (imposing liability for
an attempt to monopolize where the chairman of American Airlines called the
chairman of Braniff to discuss prices).
221 See Council Regulation 3976/87, supra note 212, arts. 1-2.
222 See id. pmbl. For a discussion of the relevance of these types of agreements
to airline alliances, see infra notes 262-70 and accompanying text.
223 See Council Regulation 3976/87, supra note 212, pmbl.
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Under its Regulation 3976/87 power, the Council subsequently
has adopted several more specific regulations.224
D. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
The EC Treaty and the Merger Regulation are silent as to
whether the Commission has extraterritorial jurisdiction.25 His-
torically, the application of the European Union's competition
rules has not been limited to the territory of the Member
States.22 6 For example, the "economic unit doctrine" has been
applied to establish jurisdiction over parent companies based in
third countries and having EU subsidiaries, by imputing the be-
havior of the subsidiary to the parent.227 This rule allowed an
American parent company to be held liable for the actions of its
subsidiary when those actions affected the European market.228
Other decisions of the ECJ and Commission also suggest that
the EU is extending the extraterritorial reach of its competition
law.229 Paradoxically, the ECJ stopped short of adopting an Al-
coa-type effects test in Wood Pulp, which involved the infringe-
ment of Article 85.23' Nevertheless, the ECJ upheld fines
imposed upon U.S., Canadian, Swedish, and Finnish companies
that fixed prices, thereby affecting EU trade and competition,
despite the fact that none of the firms had substantial EU opera-
224 See, e.g., Council Regulation 2671/88 on the Application of Art. 85(3) of
the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements Between Undertakings, Decisions
of Associations of Undertakings and Concerted Practices Concerning Joint Plan-
ning and Coordination of Capacity, Sharing of Revenue and Consultations on
Tariffs on Scheduled Air Services and Slot Allocation at Airports, 1988 O.J. (L
239) 9; Council Regulation 2408/92 on Access for Community Air Carriers to
Intra-Community Air Routes, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8. Regulation 2408/92 even al-
lows EU airlines to engage in cabotage, which is the right to fly domestic routes
in other EU countries, by April 1, 1997. See id. art. 3. This cabotage provision
may conflict with the Chicago Convention, which requires parties "not to enter
into any arrangements which specifically grant . . . privilege [s] on an exclusive
basis." Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 7, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
225 SeeJoseph P. Griffin, EC and U.S. Extraterritoriality: Activism and Cooperation,
17 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 353, 360 (1994).
226 See Reynolds & Weightman, supra note 196, at 8.
227 See id.; see also Cases 48, 49, 51-57/69, Imperial Chem. Ind., Ltd. v. Commis-
sion, 1972 C.M.L.R. 557 [hereinafter Dyestuffs].
228 See Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215.
229 See FoLsoM, supra note 89, at 345.
230 SeeJoined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117, 125-129/85, Ahlstr6m Osakeyhti6 v.
Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 5241-43 [hereinafter Wood Pulp].
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tions at the time.2 1 The Court of Justice reasoned that jurisdic-
tion was proper because the implementation of the infringing
agreement occurred in the EU.23 2
In an airline alliance where the parties have European opera-
tions, the jurisdictional problem is minimal. However, two non-
European airlines could conceivably form an alliance that meets
the requirements of either the Merger Regulation or Articles 85-
89. Relying on Wood Pulp, several Commission officials believe
that the Commission would still have jurisdiction to evaluate
such an alliance. 233 Therefore, an alliance between two non-EU
carriers, so long as their sales in at least two Member States is
above the threshold figure, will likely be subject to Commission
scrutiny, whether or not they have subsidiaries in the European
Union.234 Notably, the Court of Justice has approved the extra-
territorial reach of Articles 85 and 86 to extend to airfares both
within and outside of the EU. 35
E. INVESTIGATING AIRLINE ALLIANCES
The Commission recently issued two Notices detailing its pro-
cedure for the investigation of suspect airline alliances.236 The
Commission noted that in one instance, the U.S. Department of
Transportation had already granted immunity from the U.S. an-
titrust laws to the alliance members.237 Nevertheless, in this
case, the Commission commenced an Article 89 procedure
based on air service between the U.S. and Europe. 28 Those
parts of the respective alliances that concerned intra-EU travel
were investigated under Regulation 3975/87.239 For those parts
of the alliances not directly related to air travel, the Commission
231 See id. Note that this case was decided in 1988, seven years before Sweden
and Finland joined the EU.
2 2 See id.
2 3 See Griffin, supra note 225, at 360-61.
234 See Reynolds & Weightman, supra note 196, at 9.
235 See Case 66/86, Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekampfung unlauteren
Wettbewerbs, 1989 E.C.R. 838.
2%9 See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Agreements Between
Delta, Sabena, Swissair, and Austrian Airlines, 1996 OJ. (C 289) 6; Commission
Notice Concerning the Lufthansa, United Airlines and Scandinavian Airlines Sys-
tem Alliances, 1996 OJ. (C 289) 8. For the benefit of interested parties, both
notices contain detailed information regarding the structures of the respective
alliances.
237 See Commission Notice, 1996 OJ. (C 289) at 8, 10.
239 See id. at 6, 8, 10.
239 See id. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Regulation 3975/87.
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began an investigation under Regulation 17/62.240 Finally, the
Commission also reserved the right to invoke Article 85 at a later
time.241
VI. RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
The resolution of international antitrust disputes in airline al-
liances requires a twofold approach. First, the involved parties
should look to existing antitrust cooperation treaties for gui-
dance. Second, international air treaties may also be helpful in
resolving conflicts. Still, neither type of agreement completely
resolves the jurisdictional disputes that are almost sure to arise
as airline alliances continue to gain popularity.
A. ANTITRUST COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
The United States has taken an active role in negotiating trea-
ties with other nations to promote enforcement cooperation be-
tween the U.S. and foreign governments, as well as to reduce the
tensions that often arise in individual antitrust cases.242 The
United States regularly consults with antitrust authorities from
Japan, Canada, and the EU.243 The United States has also nego-
tiated formal bilateral cooperation agreements with several
countries, including Germany, Australia, and Canada.244 The
United States and the EU had also formalized a cooperation
agreement, 245 but the ECJ later struck it down, ruling that the
240 See Commission Notice, 1996 O.J. (C 289) at 6, 8, 10. See Commission Regu-
lation 17/62 Implementing Arts. 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, 1959-62 0J. SPEC.
ED. 87, as amended, 1995 0J. (L 1) 1.
241 See Commission Notice, 1996 0J. (C 289) at 13.
242 See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 127, at 20,589-7.
243 See id.
244 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Relating to Mutual
Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, U.S.-F.R.G.,
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,501; Agreement Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of Australia Relating
to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.-Austl., reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,502 [hereinafter U.S.-Australia Agreement]; Agree-
ment Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of Canada Regarding the Application of Their Competition and Deceptive
Marketing Practices Laws, Aug. 3, 1995, U.S.-Can., reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,503 [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Agreement]. The United States and
the United Kingdom do not have any kind of antitrust agreement. See FOLSOM,
supra note 89, at 351. Some commentators have suggested that the United States
enact its own blocking statute against the EU! See id.
245 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application
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Commission had exceeded its authority in negotiating the ac-
cord.246 Finally, NAFTA compels the United States, Canada,
and Mexico to cooperate on antitrust matters. 247
The U.S.-Australian agreement is typical of bilateral coopera-
tion agreements. The Australian government believes that U.S.
courts are not the proper institutions to weigh the interests of
international parties during private antitrust litigation.24
Whenever the Australian government is concerned about a pri-
vate antitrust proceeding in a U.S. court involving an Australian
party, the Australian government can require the United States
to report the outcome of consultations between the two govern-
ments to the court.2 4 9 The court is under no obligation to even
consider these views; it merely receives a report.250 In return for
this courtesy, Australia has indicated its willingness to be more
receptive to discovery requests in U.S. antitrust litigation. 251 Fur-
thermore, Australia will consult the U.S. before invoking its
blocking statute.252
Mutual legal assistance treaties (MLTAs) are another means
of facilitating international antitrust cooperation. 253  Under
MLTAs, the United States and a foreign country agree to assist
one another in investigating criminal antitrust violations.254 The
DOJ has the authority to negotiate such treaties under the Inter-
national Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994.255
MLTAs are currently in force with well over a dozen countries,
with others in the process of negotiation or ratification. 251
of Their Competition Laws, Nov. 23, 1990, U.S.-European Community, reprinted
in 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 382.
246 See French Republic v. Commission, No. C-327/91, E.C.R. Aug. 9, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Intlaw library, ECcase file.
247 See North American Free Trade Agreement, ch. 15, 32 I.L.M. 605, 663 (Dec.
8-17, 1992).
248 See FOLSOM, supra note 89, at 350.
249 See id.; U.S.-Australia Agreement, supra note 244, art. 2.
250 See FoLsoM, supra note 89, at 350.
2515 See id.; U.S.-Australia Agreement, supra note 244, art. 5.
252 See FOLSOM, supra note 89, at 350.
2 3 See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 127, at 20,589-7.
254 See id.
255 Pub. L. No. 103-48, 108 Stat. 4597 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212
(Supp. 1995)).
256 See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 127, at 20,589-7. See, e.g., Treaty with
Canada on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, S. Treaty Doc. No. 28,
100th Cong. (1988).
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Nonetheless, the effectiveness of antitrust cooperation agree-
ments remains questionable.257 Diplomatic accords typically
have very little influence on either the U.S. judiciary or private
litigants.258 The U.S.-Canada Agreement, for instance, is one of
several similar treaties that the countries have entered into since
1959.59 Yet a bitter antitrust dispute between the Canadian and
U.S. governments still arose in United Nuclear Corp. v. General
Atomic Co. 2130 In light of cases such as this one, it is unlikely that
cooperation agreements, despite their good faith intent, will
effectively cool tempers in matters of antitrust extraterri-
toriality.261
B. THE CHICAGO CONVENTION AND BILATERAL
AIR AGREEMENTS
With the growth of international air travel following World
War II, the nations of the world met to develop a regulatory
framework for this growing industry.26 2 The product of these
meetings was the Chicago Convention, which opened for signa-
ture in 1944.263 The Chicago Convention did not, however, es-
tablish a multilateral system of regulating international
flights.264 Instead, Article 6 stated that "[n] o scheduled interna-
tional air service may be operated over or into the territory of a
contracting State, except with the special permission or authori-
zation of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such
permission or authorization. 265
The International Air Transport Agreement (LATA), which
was annexed to the Chicago Convention, envisioned a multilat-
eral approach to airline regulation. However, many signatories
of the Chicago Convention were reluctant to sign on to the
257 See ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 40, at 933.
258 See id. at 936.
259 See id. at 933.
260 629 P.2d 231 (N.M. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981); see generally AN-
DERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 40, at 933-35 (discussing the controversy).
261 See ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 40, at 935.
262 See Adam L. Schiess, Open Skies: Loosening the Protectionist Grip on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation, 8 EMORy INT'L L. REv. 435, 438 (1994).
263 See Chicago Convention, supra note 224.
264 See Schless, supra note 262, at 438.
265 Chicago Convention, supra note 224, art. 6.
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IATA. 66 Consequently, this reluctance led to "the creation of
the modern bilateral system of aviation relations. 267
More than 4000 bilateral air agreements currently exist." 8
Though the Bermuda I agreement between the United States
and the United Kingdom was the model for these treaties in the
first thirty years after the Chicago Convention, the last twenty
years have seen a tremendous diversification in the terms and
scope of these agreements. 26 9 Nevertheless, bilateral air agree-
ments almost always include provisions restricting routes, capaci-
ties, and fares.27 °
C. OPEN SKIEs AGREEMENTS
The existing bilateral air agreements are often too narrow in
their scope to be of any assistance to airlines contemplating an
alliance. The current bilateral aviation treaty between the
United States and the United Kingdom, for example, only allows
four airlines to operate out of Heathrow International Airport:
British Airways, Virgin Atlantic, United Airlines, and American
Airlines. 27' Flight frequencies and routes are highly restricted,
and other airlines-including potential alliance partners-are
effectively shut out of Heathrow by this agreement. 272 An airline
commission appointed by President Clinton declared in 1993
"that the bilateral system of international aviation agreements
has run its course .... ",27. Consequently, the United States is
pursuing a policy of establishing much broader treaties with for-
eign nations, including the United Kingdom. These treaties are
commonly referred to as open skies agreements.
Open skies refers to the policy of bilaterally deregulating in-
ternational air transportation in all areas except safety and se-
curity. 274 A typical open skies agreement allows for greater
2( 66 See Andras Vamos-Goldman, The Stagnation of Economic Regulation Under Pub-
lic International Air Law: Examining its Contribution to the Woeful State of the Airline
Industy, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 425, 434 (1996).
267 Schless, supra note 262, at 439.
268 See Vamos-Goldman, supra note 266, at 435.
269 See id. at 434.
'271 See id. at 435.
2 See Greg Mahlich, BA/American Faces European Political Battle, REUTERS EUR.
Bus. REP., Jan. 17, 1997.
272 See id.
273 Ruwantissa I. R. Abeyratne, Would Competition in Commercial Aviation Ever Fit
Into The World Trade Organization?, 61 J. A[ L. & COM. 793, 817 (1996).
274 See Michele Kayal, U.S. to Open Air Talks with Four Asian Nations, J. OF COM.,
Jan. 14, 1997, at lB.
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cooperation between U.S. airlines and foreign carriers, particu-
larly in the coordination of prices and schedules.27 5 These
agreements usually require the complete removal of restrictions
on flights and routes, including those involving third nations,
and often contain provisions for code-sharing and charter ar-
rangements. 276 Generally, open skies agreements are much
broader than most existing bilateral air agreements.
The United States negotiated its first successful open skies
agreement in 1978 with the Netherlands.277 Since that time, the
United States has also established open skies agreements with
Canada, Germany, and ten smaller European nations.27 The
tremendous growth in the Pacific Rim market has motivated the
United States to begin negotiating open skies agreements with
Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Tai-
wan, andJapan.7 9 Moreover, the United States is in the process
of negotiating similar treaties with France, the United Kingdom,
and the European Union. 280 The European Commission has
taken the position that it, and not an individual Member State,
is the proper authority to negotiate such agreements on behalf
of the European Union.281 Consequently, the European Com-
mision has brought suit against all Member States who have
agreed to open skies treaties with the United States.282
Current DOT policy prohibits antitrust immunity in global al-
liances unless an open skies agreement exists between the con-
tracting parties' respective governments. 283 Both British Airways
and American Airlines acknowledge that an open skies agree-
275 See id.
276 See Kohei Murayama, U.S. Eyes "Open Skies" Pact with Five Asia-Pacific Nations,
JAPAN ECON. NEWSWI, RE, Jan. 9, 1997.
277 See Vamos-Goldman, supra note 266, at 455-56.
278 See id.; Alexander MacLeod, Europe Protests British Air Alliance, CHRISTIAN SCi.
MONITOR, Jan. 15, 1997, at 8.
279 See Murayama, supra note 276; Kayal, supra note 274, at lB. Singapore is the
first Asian nation to successfully negotiate an open skies agreement with the
United States. See U.S. and Singapore Lift Limits on Airline Access, WALL ST. J., Jan.
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ment is essential to the approval of their alliance. 284 Further-
more, the European Commission's initial criticism of the British
Airway/American Airlines alliance is largely due to the absence
of any U.S.-U.K open skies agreement. 21 5 Consequently, many
aviation analysts see open skies agreements as a necessary step in
establishing effective airline alliances. 8 6
VII. CONCLUSION
International airline alliances rapidly are becoming a major
part of the international air transportation industry. Because
the alliances necessarily involve cooperation between competing
carriers, they may run afoul of antitrust laws promulgated by
one or more governing bodies. While it is clear that the United
States, the European Union, and other national governments
have a valid interest in regulating these alliances, it is not so
clear how the relevant parties will resolve their respective juris-
dictional disputes.
All agree that the extraterritorial application of one govern-
ment's laws to parties outside its borders is controversial and
possibly even undesirable. However, current statutes and trea-
ties do not completely resolve this dispute. The Chicago Con-
vention and most other bilateral air treaties were negotiated
long before airline alliances became prevalent. Furthermore,
although antitrust cooperation agreements are couched in
terms of "consultation," "mutual respect," and "resolution, 287
they typically carry little weight in the courts that ultimately must
interpret them. Moreover, the current bilateral air agreements
do not always specifically address the central legal controversies
involved in airline alliances. Thus, the current bilateral system
cannot readily support the growing number of airline alliances
and the accompanying expansion of international air
transportation.
Open skies agreements are a necessary step in the right direc-
tion ,28 although they can create even more controversy. Never-
theless, the explosion of international airline alliances, as well as
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the billions of dollars in revenue at stake each year, requires a
quick and well-reasoned solution to this dilemma. The govern-
ments of the world must reevaluate their current policies if air-
line alliances are to succeed.
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